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Scalable Hash-based IP Traceback using
Rate-limited Probabilistic Packet Marking
Minho Sung, Jason Chiang, and Jun (Jim) Xu
Abstract— Recent surveys show that DDoS attack is still one of
the major threats to the Internet security. Many techniques have
been proposed to trace the origin of attacking packets, known as
IP traceback problem, using either hash-based packet logging or
probabilistic packet marking. However, both approaches have
scalability problems under the heavy DDoS attacks in terms
of the space and computational overheads. In this paper, we
propose a novel scalable IP Traceback scheme by utilizing the
advantage of both packet logging and marking to balance the
overheads at routers and at the victim, hence scalable for both
sides. The baseline idea of our approach is to sample a very
small percentage (e.g., 1%) of packets at the routers, and save
the digests of only sampled packets. At the same time, the routers
mark their signature using very simple marking scheme into the
marking field of sampled IP packets to send out the “information
of logging” to the victim in probabilistic way to help the traceback
procedure. We also propose a heuristic technique to improve the
performance of the marking scheme. In the result, the number
of attacking packets the victim should collect for the traceback
procedure to achieve high level of traceback accuracy is much
less than the numbers in previous PPM schemes, and also the
computational and storage overhead in routers are much less
than previous packet logging approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, large number of Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks have been launched to various targets
such as high-profile commercial websites [1], IRC chatting
servers [2], Internet infrastructure (root DNS servers) [3] or
contents distribution systems [4]. Despite the large efforts to
defend against, recent surveys [5], [6] show that DDoS attack
is still one of the major threats to the Internet security. One
of the reasons that keep the frequency of the DDoS attack
high is that tracing and punishing the attacking sources are
very hard under the current Internet. This is because the
Internet only uses destination IP address to make the routing
decision and does not maintain any information about the
routed packets. Therefore, when the attackers use the forged
source IP addresses in the attacking packets, there is no way
to find the origins of the attacks.
Recently, many techniques are proposed to trace the ori-
gin of an IP packet, known as IP traceback problem. Most
of them requires the Internet to maintain certain level of
inevitable additional information about the routed packets.
These algorithms can be categorized into two groups according
to the place to maintain the additional information. First
approach is to use the small limited marking field in IP packet
header [7], [8], [9]. In this approach, routers randomly select
the packets and mark partial path information into the marking
fields in selected packets (referred as PPM(Probabilistic Packet
Marking) approach). Then the victim can reconstruct the
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attack paths using the information in marking fields of many
attacking IP packets received. Second approach is to store the
information about the routed packets in each router’s local
storage [10] (referred as packet logging approach). Each router
stores packet digests in the form of Bloom filters at its local
disks, and this information is used for traceback procedure
later.
However, both approaches have scalability problems un-
der the heavy DDoS attacks in terms of the overheads in
the algorithms [11]. PPM approach requires the victim pro-
hibitively high number of attacking packets to be collected and
high computational overhead for traceback procedure, mostly
due to the high complexity of coding/decoding of the path
information using limited marking space. On the contrary,
packet logging approach requires prohibitive computational
and storage overhead to the routers with very high speed links.
A. Our new scalable approach
In this paper, we propose a novel IP traceback scheme which
balances the overheads at routers and at the victim, hence
scalable for both sides. The scheme presented in this paper
is a new approach from our previous work on scalable IP
traceback scheme [11], which can achieve high accuracy of
the IP traceback and can scale very well to a large number
of attackers. Our previous approach is to sample and log a
small percentage (e.g., 3.3%) of packets using an efficient
sampling scheme utilizing only 1 bit flag in IP header. In the
new approach, we investigate the possibility to further decrease
the sampling and traceback overhead in the cost of using more
marking space (e.g. 16 bits) in IP header.
The baseline idea of our approach is to sample a very small
percentage of packets at the routers, and save the digests of
only sampled packets. At the same time, the routers mark their
signatures using very simple marking scheme into the marking
field of sampled IP packets to send out the “information of
logging” to the victim in probabilistic way. Once the victim
collects at least one signature from each of the routers on
attacking paths in high probability after receiving enough
number of attacking packets, it can initiate the traceback
procedure using recursive query to the upstream routers1.
We also propose a heuristic technique to further improve
the performance of our approach or any PPM-based scheme,
observing the following intrinsic problem at any PPM-based
scheme. The probability that a marking from a router reaches
to the victim without being overwritten by any other routers on
the path is geometrically smaller the further away the router
is from the victim. In the result, in any time period, the victim
receives much larger number of marks from the nearer routers
1This procedure is similar with the ones in [10], [11], but different in the
selection of the set of attacking packets for the traceback query.
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than the ones from the further routers, so the time to collect
all the marks from the furthest router is the main bottleneck
of PPM schemes. We introduce a novel heuristic technique to
improve the performance as following. We use a special simple
data structure at the routers to control the rate of marking to
a certain destination during a given time epoch. Using this
technique, the nearer routers may decrease the rate of their
marks to the victim while the further routers may have more
survival probability of their marks to the victim. One salient
point of this approach is that more performance improvement
can be achieved as the intensity of a DDoS attack is increasing,
because the gain of the data structure is also increasing.
Extensive simulation results based on real-world network
topologies show that our new approach can improve the
performance of the traceback drastically. First, the routers
only have to maintain very small amount of information about
the packets going through them. With a very low sampling
rate (e.g. 1%), the storage and computational cost becomes
much smaller than existing packet logging approach or our
previous scheme. Second, the average number of attacking
packets required for traceback procedure to achieve high level
of traceback accuracy can be much less than existing PPM-
based schemes or our previous approaches. This improvement
comes from the simplicity of our marking scheme. Each
router transmit only one piece of information using marking
field without any information fragmentation which causes the
significant traceback overhead to the victim. The effectiveness
of our heuristic technique is the other reason of this improve-
ment. Third, the overhead for the traceback query message
transmission at the victim can be drastically decreased. In our
previous scheme, the size of a query message to a router is
up to a few megabytes. However, in the new scheme, this size
can be decreased to one or two kilobytes due to the packet
selection procedure, which means that a few number of IP
packets is enough to transmit a query message. Finally, it
can eliminate the marking field spoofing problem, which is
a serious drawback in previous PPM approach allowing some
false marking information from the attackers, by comparing
victim’s set of attacking packets as an evidence with the
logging information at routers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. An overview
of the proposed algorithm is presented in the next section.
This is followed by a detailed description of the design in
Section III. Parameter tuning of the proposed schemes and
the analysis of traceback overhead is presented at Section IV.
Evaluation of algorithms using simulations on traffic traces is
presented in Section V. We review related work in Section VI
and conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section we first present an overview of our new
scalable traceback approach. Then, we explain an intrinsic
problem of PPM-based approach, and propose our new heuris-
tic technique to overcome the problem for further improvement
of the traceback performance.
A. Overview of the scheme
In this paper, we propose a new IP traceback scheme that
has scalable algorithms at both the routers with high link
speeds and the victim under the heavy DDoS attack. We
assume that each router has storage resource to save the digests
of the small percentage (e.g., 1%) of traffic. We also assume
that the 16-bit IP fragmentation field in packet IP header can
be used to store the mark of the routers throughout this paper.
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As introduced in Section I, the baseline idea of our approach
is to require Internet routers to record Bloom filter digests of
packets going through them, like [7]. However, unlike [7],
which records 100% of packets, our scheme only samples a
small percentage (e.g., 1%) of packets at the routers, and save
the digests of only these sampled packets.
The attack graph reconstruction can be initiated by the vic-
tim using recursive queries to the upstream routers, similarly
to [7]. However, it is no longer possible to trace one attacker
with only one packet because each router has bloom filter
digests for different set of sampled packets. Instead, in our
scheme, for sending the traceback query to a router, the victim
uses a set of packets which have high possibility that they
are logged at the router being queried, and different set of
packets will be used for querying to different router. To help
victim’s packet selection, routers send out the information
about their logging of sampled packets using the marking
fields of those sampled packets. This is done with very simple
marking method. The routers use the hash value of their IP
addresses as their signature, and mark this value into the
marking field of all sampled packets.
Once received a set of the attacking packets which contains
at least one signature from each of the routers on attacking
paths in high probability, the victim can initiate the traceback
procedure using recursive query to the upstream routers as
follows. When the victim send a traceback query to a router 
, it first select the small subset of packets, which contains the
signature of
 
, out of the collected set of attacking packets.
Then the victim asks to router
 
whether it has seen any of
those packets, and
 
answer the the question using the Bloom
filter test. If the answer is yes, the victim will include the router 
to the attack graph reconstruction.
B. New heuristic technique to improve Probabilistic Packet
Marking
In existing PPM approach, every router uses the same
marking probability  . This gives the simplicity of the im-
plementation, but it has an intrinsic problem as follows. The
probability that a mark from a router is reached to the victim
not being overwritten by other routers on the path is 	
 ,
where  is the number of hops from the router to the victim.
So, a router is expected to mark    packets in averageto deliver its mark to the victim. This number of required
packets geometrically increases as  increases. In the result,
in any time period, the victim receives much larger number
of marks from the nearer routers than the further routers.
2The IP fragmentation field has been reused in the PPM-based IP traceback
schemes. The “backward compatibility” issues has been discussed in [7].
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Fig. 1. An example of attack graph
This phenomenon makes the total number of attacking packets
for the victim to collect all kinds of the marks very large.
Note that it is important for the victim to collect at least
one instance of each mark, and the duplicate occurrences of
the same mark does not help but only degrades the traceback
performance. This problem is aggravated under the situation
of heavy DDoS attack because nearer routers will deliver more
attacking traffic than the further routers to the victim, hence
mark more packets. Figure 1 shows an example of attack graph
when ten hosts attack the victim simultaneously. If we assume
that all attackers send the same rate   of attacking traffic to the
victim, the victim will receive    marks from the router 
 , but only  	   	    from each of routers   
  
     ,
which is 11 times less rate of marks when we use 0.05 as the
value of  (typical value in existing PPM schemes).
In our scheme, we propose a new heuristic technique to
improve the performance of the marking scheme as follows.





     in upper example into two parts. First
part is   , which represents the rate of initial marking from
each router. Second part is    	 which is the probability
that the initial mark is overwritten by the other routers on
the path to the victim. To increases the rate of mark reached
at the victim, we use higher value of  (e.g., 0.2) than the
previous PPM scheme, to increases the initial mark rate   .
Then, to decreases the probability that this initial mark is
overwritten, each router limits the number of marking to a
certain destination to only one during a certain time window.
For this purpose, routers maintain a bit array as the set of flags.
We will refer this very simple data structure as “rate-limiter”.
When a packet arrives, with probability  , router hashes the
destination IP to get an index of one flag. If selected flag is
not set, the router logs and marks the packet, and set this
flag. For the next sampled packets to the same destination
within the same time window, no logging or marking will
be performed. At the end of time window, the flag will be
reset. In the result, the rate of duplicated marks from the
nearer routers will be much decreased, and this can give high
significant improvement of the performance by improving the
chance of the marks from the further router to reach the victim
without being overwritten. Note that increasing the value of
 does not mean the increment of overall overhead, because
we can control the average rate of marking, which is much
less than the value of  , by configuring the parameters of the
Probabilistic Logging and Marking procedure at router 
(given sampling rate  ):
1. for each packet 
2. if ( ! #"%$&('*)	 ) then
3. Bloom filter insert(,+ -#/.-#%0 );
4. ,+ 1243,54 := " ;
5. ,+ 678:9(6 := ; ( <+ => );
6. else
7. Increase 4+ 1?4352 ;
Bloom filter insert( @ ):
(given # of hash functions  ):
8. Set bits A<B 1DC( E@'GF , ..., AHB 1I% E@'GF to 1;
Fig. 2. Probabilistic Logging and Marking (PLM) scheme
rate-limiter. More detailed description of this procedure will
be presented at the next section.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we present our basic scheme and reconstruc-
tion procedure in Section III-A and Section III-B, respectively.
Then we explain the advanced marking scheme using rate-
limiter in Section III-C in detail.
A. Probabilistic Logging and Marking (PLM) scheme
Our Probabilistic Logging and Marking (PLM) scheme is
presented in Figure 2. As described in Section II, all partic-
ipating routers sample the packets using predefined marking
probability  . The sampled packets will be saved in the form
of Bloom filter digests, and also will be marked to send the
router’s signature to the victim. Detailed description about
packet logging and marking procedure is following.
Packet logging: For every sampled packet, the router records
the packet digests (line 3 and 8 in Figure 2) using a space-
efficient data structure known as Bloom filter [12], like








of size S is described by an array T ofU bits, initialized to 0. A Bloom filter uses V independent
hash functions W 
 W %
  






insertion, given a packet
N
to be inserted into a set J , the bitsTZY WD[  N ]\ , ^_K  
:`
  
 V , are set to 1. To query for a packeta , i.e., to check if a is in J , we check the values of the bitsTZY WD[  a \ , ^<K  
:`
  
 V . The answer to the query is yes if
all these bits are 1, and no otherwise. Same as in [10], the
first 24 invariant bytes of an IP packet is used as hash input
including the invariant portion of the IP header (16 bytes) and
the first 8 bytes of the payload.
A Bloom filter guarantees not to have any false negative,
i.e., returning “no” even though the set actually contains the
packet. However, it may contain false positives, i.e., returning
“yes” while the packet is not in the set. The capacity factor,
denoted as b , of a Bloom filter is defined as the ratio of U
to S . In this paper, we assume the Bloom filter at each router
is paged to disk before b decreases to V/c*dfe ` . Then according
to [12], the false positive rate of the Bloom filter is no more
than `  X .
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Encoding procedure at router 
(given sampling rate  ):
1. for each packet 4
2. if ( /! #"$:&(' )	 ) then
3. -#9 @ := ; C (+  90, => );
4. if ( ;467?0B -#/9 @2F " ) then
5. ;46f?0B -#9(@?F  &
6. Bloom filter insert(,+ -#.%-#0 );
7. 4+ 1?4352 := " ;
8. 4+ 6f%8,9(6 := ;
	 ( H+ => );
9. else
10. Increase ,+ 1243,54 ;
11. else
12. Increase ,+ 1243,54 ;
Fig. 3. Rate-limited Probabilistic Logging and Marking (RPLM) scheme
Packet marking: We use the 16-bit marking space which
consists of two fields. We use the first 5 bits as the hopcount in
a same way as in the existing PPM schemes 3 The remaining
11 bits is used to mark the label, defined by the output of
hash function with the router’s IP address. When a packet is
sampled, the router writes its 11-bits label to the marking field
of the packet (line 5 in Figure 2), and sets the hopcount field
to 0. For the packets not sampled, routers saturately increases
the hopcount field.
B. Traceback processing
When the victim detects a DDoS attack, it will trigger a
traceback procedure. The victim will first collect a decent
number of attack packets. Then it will use these packets to
track down the attackers. We denote the set of packets that is
used for traceback as  .
The traceback procedure starts with the victim checking all
its immediate neighbors. To check any router J which is one
hop away from the victim, the victim first sift out the subset of
packets  from   using two conditions : RV WDbDS K
 AND PV  K! GJ" #%$  , i.e, packets should have the
hopcount from the victim to J and should have the signature
of J . Then, the victim will query the corresponding (right
date and time) Bloom filter at J with the set & . The routerJ is added to the reconstructing attack tree if at least one
match is found. Each neighbor
 
of J will then be queried
by new set of packets ' , sifted from  with new conditions
: PV WDbPS K ` AND PV  K(     #)$  . Again, if at
least one match is found,
 
will be added to the attack tree.
Otherwise, no more neighbor routers of
 
will be queried.
This process is repeated recursively until it cannot proceed.
C. Rate-limited Probabilistic Logging and Marking (RPLM)
scheme
Our PLM scheme can get a high accuracy of traceback
result with very low overhead at routers at the victim, but the
performance improvement is limited by the geometric problem
3This 5 bit requirement can be decreased to 1 bit utilizing Time-To-
Live(TTL) field modification scheme in [13]. In this case, the performance
of our scheme can be improved by increasing the size of remaining marking
space.
of PPM approach mentioned in Section II-B. Our Rate-limited
Probabilistic Logging and Marking (RPLM) scheme applying
new heuristic technique to further improve the performance
is presented in Figure 3. To limit the rate of packet logging
and marking in a time window to a certain destination, we
use rate-limiter consisting of a bit array, which is a very
simple data structure. Two important parameters of rate-limiter
are the size of bit array  and the length of epoch  for
operation. In every  seconds, all flags in the rate-limiter
are reset to zero. When a packet is arrived and sampled, the
router select a random bit, indexed by the hash value of the
destination IP in the packet (line 3 in Figure 3). If the value
of selected bit is zero, the router will run the logging and
marking algorithm as in the basic scheme. If it is not zero,
it may mean that another packet to the same destination is
already logged and marked in the same time epoch. In this
case, logging and marking procedure will be skipped for this
packet. Due to the possible hash collision to select a random
bit for different packets with their destination IPs, logging
and marking procedure can be mistakenly skipped for some
packets. To decrease the frequency of this mistakes while
keeping the level of performance improvement high, the value
of  and  should be tuned appropriately. We present how
to tune these two parameters given a target level of storage
overhead in Section IV-A. We also show that the performance
of our RPLM scheme can be much better than the performance
of PLM scheme in Section V.
IV. TUNING PARAMETERS OF RATE-LIMITER AND
OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present the way to tune the pa-
rameters of rate-limiter given a target level of storage and
computational overhead at the routers for logging and marking
operation. Then we analyze the average number of attacking
packets required for the traceback procedure.
A. Tuning parameters of rate-limiter given a target level of
storage overhead
In our PLM scheme, the maximum sampling and logging
rate $+* in a router will be equal or larger than the value of
marking probability  because all randomly selected packets
will be logged and marked. However, in our RPLM scheme,
$+* is controlled by two parameters of rate-limiter: the size
of limiter  and the length of epoch  . This is because the
maximum possible number of logging and marking operation
during an epoch is limited to the bit size of rate-limiter. This in
turn implies that if we have a target level of storage overhead,
the value of  and  can be tuned appropriately, as following.
Let $,* be the target level of storage overhead. The smaller
the value of $+* the better, as long as it is enough to get a
high level of traceback accuracy. And let  be the maximum
number of packets per second at a link with conservative
assumption of 1000 bits average packet size. Then the value
of $ * is equal to  c -   . If we target the value of $ * as
























Fig. 4. Expected number of packets   need for reconstructing a path of
length 
low as 1% 4 and use 10 milliseconds as the value of  , we
can set the value of  as         . For example, in a OC-192
link (10 Gbps), we can use 1000 bit rate-limiter. Simulation
results in Section V show that the small 1000-bit rate-limiter
can improve the performance drastically.
B. Number of attacking packets required for the traceback
procedure
If the victim collects enough attacking packets, which
contains at least one marked packets from each routers on the
attacking paths in high probability, the traceback processing
can be initiated. Therefore, the number of attacking packets
required for the traceback procedure can be estimated by using
the coupon collector’s problem as following. Here we provide
the theorem from our previous work [14] with the modification
of the parameters for the scheme in this paper. Refer [14] for
the proof.
Theorem 1: Let  be the probability of packet marking by
an Internet router. Let  be the hop distance from the victim
to the related router and V be the number of information
fragments from the router in marking procedure. Then, the
average number of packets  that need to be received for the
victim to reconstruct the path of length  (in number of hops)
is
 K  







        % W  K    	
 
          Figure 4 shows the comparison of the value of  as 
increases. Our scheme uses 1 as the value of V while existing
PPM-based schemes typically uses 4 or 8. Three curves in the
graph show the increment of  when V =1,4,8 respectively.
The graph clearly shows that our scheme require much smaller
4Note that the maximum sampling rate  "! is different from the storage
requirement relative to the link capacity. The latter is decided by the bloom
filter parameters. It will be 0.005 % of link capacity if we use same parameters
for the logging as in [10].
number of  compared to the other PPM-based schemes. This
advantage comes from the simplicity of our marking scheme,
in the additional cost of small logging overhead.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme using real-world Internet traffic traces. We show that
our scheme can achieve high accuracy of traceback using a
small number of attack packets even when there are a large
number of attackers.
A. Simulation setup
Simulating network-wide IP traceback scheme requires
highly scalable network simulation tool because thousands
or millions of nodes can be involved. However, the current
popular network simulation tools such as ns2 [15] or OPNET
Modeler [16] are not scalable to very large scale network
simulation. Therefore, we have developed our own event-
driven simulation tools (available at [17]) based on high level
of abstraction in network events, which is not directly related
to DDoS attack or IP traceback, for scalability.
In a simulation, we first load the topology information from
the real-world Internet topologies. Then we randomly choose
the attackers and legitimate users to transmit attacking and
normal traffic to the victim respectively.
1) topologies: The following three real-world network
topologies are used in our simulation study.# Skitter data I – collected from a CAIDA-owned host (a-
root.skitter.caida.org) on 11/28/2001 as a part of the Skitter
project [18]. This data contains the traceroute data from this
server to 192,900 destinations.# Skitter data II – collected from another CAIDA host
(e-root.skitter.caida.org) on 11/27/2001, containing routes to
158,181 destinations.# Bell-lab’s dataset – collected from a Bell-labs host [19],
containing routes to 86,813 destinations. We merged six route
sets originated from the same host into one and trimmed
incomplete paths.
All three topologies are routes from a single origin to many
destinations in the Internet. In our simulation, we assume that
this origin is the victim, and the attackers and the legitimate
clients are randomly distributed among the destination hosts.
2) Traffic modeling: In our simulation, we model the net-
work traffic during a given time epoch  as following. Each
legitimate clients randomly generate the packets to the victim.
The average inter-arrival time of the packets from a client
follows exponential distribution with rate    . Each attackers
generate the random attacking traffic to the victim in a same
way, but with much higher average inter-arrival time  %$ .
Each router on the attack path compiles the packets from
legitimate clients and the attackers during the same epoch,
and then randomly save the digests and mark using the
proposed scheme. The background traffic is also considered
in the simulation because it can affect the performance of
the proposed scheme due to the hash collision in the rate-
limiter. To simulate the background traffic at a router during a
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given time epoch, we randomly choose a part of the following
real packet header traces and apply the proposed algorithm to
simulate the effect of the hash collision.# Trace from University of North Carolina (UNC) (cour-
tesy of Prof. Jeffay) – collected at the 1 Gbps access link
connecting the campus to the rest of the Internet, on April 24,
2003.# Trace from University of Southern California (USC)
(courtesy of Prof. Papadopoulos) – collected at their Los
Nettos tracing facility on Feb 2004.
3) Performance metrics: To evaluate the accuracy of the
attack tree constructed by the traceback scheme, we use two
metrics: false negatives ratio (FNR) and false positive ratio
(FPR). We call the attack paths that is not detected by the
traceback scheme as false negatives. FNR of an attack tree
constructed by the traceback scheme is defined as the ratio of
the number of false negatives to the number of actual attack
paths. Traceback scheme may identify attack paths that are
not actually on attack graph, because of the nature of Bloom
filters. We call these paths false positives. The FPR of an attack
tree constructed by the traceback scheme is defined as the ratio
of the number of false positives to the total number of attack
paths in the attack tree.
B. Performance of our scheme
Figures 5(a,b,c) show the FNR of the proposed scheme
against the average number of attack packets from an attacker,
under the three aforementioned Internet topologies. Similarly,
Figures 6(a,b,c) show the FPR values. In all figures, we use
1000 bits rate-limiter and 10 millisecond epoch length. The
three curves in each figure correspond to 1,000, 2,000 and
5,000 attackers, respectively. All curves in Figures 5(a,b,c)
show that as the number of attack packets used for traceback
increases, FNR value decreases sharply. For example, more
that 98% of the attacking path can be identified with only
150 packets from each attacker in average, in all three curves.
This result shows that the performance of the proposed scheme
is much better than previous PPM-based schemes which
require more than thousands of the packets from each attacker.
Another salient point is that our scheme performs better if
the number of attacker increases. This shows the effectiveness
of using rate-limiter to improve the performance of traceback
scheme by reducing duplicated marking information from the
routers near the victim, and hence increasing the chance to
reach to the victim of the marking information from further
routers. As shown in Figures 6(a,b,c), the FPR value increases
very slowly as the average number of packets increases, and
is always reasonable.
The two curves in each Figures 7(a,b,c) compares perfor-
mance when we use (RPLM scheme, upper curve) and not
use (PLM scheme, lower curve) the rate-limiter under the
attack from 1000 attackers. Clearly, rate-limiter can decrease
the curve more sharply, and the victim can get much better
traceback results with a given number of average packets from
an attacker.
Figures 8(a,b,c) shows the performance result when we
change the marking probability  from 0.1 to 0.4. All graph
with three different topology show that we can get the best
result when we use 0.2 as the marking probability. If the
marking probability is lower than 0.2, the amount of initial
marking each router becomes too small to be delivered to the
victim without mark overwriting. If the marking probability
become too large, the mark in packets from a router will be
overwritten by the following routers on the path to the victim
with high probability.
VI. RELATED WORK
Two main classes of solutions has been proposed to address
IP traceback problem. One class is PPM approach [7], [8], [9]
and the other is packet logging approach [10]. However, both
approaches have a scalability problems under heavy DDoS
attack due to their own algorithm overhead.
Many techniques to reduce the overheads of the two ap-
proaches are proposed. Yaar et al. [13] propose to utilize Time-
To-Live(TTL) field in IP header to reduce the complexity of
the packet marking scheme in [8]. Using their scheme, the
size of counter field in any packet marking scheme which
uses the counter field can be reduced from 5 bits to only 1
bit. This scheme can be also combined with our proposed
scheme in this paper to improve the performance. Technique to
improve packet logging approach is proposed in our previous
work [11]. Our previous approach is to sample and log a small
percentage of packets using an smart and efficient sampling
scheme utilizing only 1 bit flag in IP header to drastically
reduce the space and computational overheads in routers.
Basheer and Manimaran [20] proposes a hybrid scheme to
utilize the advantages of both packet marking and logging,
similarly to ours. In their work, routers on the attacking path
create distributed linked list using their packet marking and
logging scheme. Then the victim can traceback the origins of
the packets by tracing the linked list by sending queries to the
upstream routers.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel IP traceback
approach utilizing both packet logging and PPM approach.
In this work, the overheads at the routers and the victim can
be drastically decreased relative to existing PPM approaches
or packet logging approaches. We have also introduced a
heuristic technique to further improve the performance of the
packet marking scheme. Our simulation results show that the
proposed scheme performs and scales very well to get the high
accuracy of IP traceback result with a very small number of
attack packets at the victim and very small packet logging
overhead at routers.
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